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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16461 
GOLD OIL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the validity of a quit-claim deed 
(Exhibit 1) to 12-1/2 acres of land in Utah County wherein the 
respondent, Gold Oil Land Development Corporation, was the 
gr an tor and Leo M. Bertagnole was the grantee. The respondent 
(plaintiff in the court below) claims that the deed was void for 
lack of delivery and lack of consideration. There were subsequent 
attempts to convey the subject property by the defendant, Leo 
M. Bertagnole, and the defendant, Steven C. Davis, the effective-
ness of which to convey title depended upon the validity of 
Exhibit 1. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A trial was held on April 2, 1979, before the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, Judge, in the Fourth Judicial District Cour: 
of Utah County, without a jury. Upon submission 'Jf the matter· 
him for decision, the court found that there was no valid, 
absolute delivery of the quit-claim deed (Exhibit 1), but that 
the deli very was conditional and the deli very conditions had nc 
been performed. 
The court also found that the subsequent deeds involving 
the subject property (Exhibits 2 and 3) were also invalid and 
not effective to convey any title to the property described 
therein. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant/ appellant, Steven C. Davis, seeks ':o have 
the lower court's decision reversed, and to have the matter 
remanded to the lower court for further trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The brief of the appellant fails to set forth an adeqw 
statement of facts. The record on file in this court supports 
the following statement of facts: 
The respondent owned an option to purchase 142-1/ 2 acre 
of real property in Salem Hills, Utah County, which property• 
owned by Mack A; Jacobson and E. D. Jacobson (Exhibit 9). The 
validity of the option agreement is not in question. 
On February 8, 1977, the 12-1/2 acres subject of this 
action was involved in a sale/option agreement between the 
respondent and International Mortgages, Inc. (Exhibit 7). 
2 
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Upon returning from a trip to Hawaii, Verdi R. \Vhite, 
Chairman of the Board of the respondent corporation, discovered 
that the appellant Davis had come into possession of a signed 
blank deed and had filled in his name and that of his wife as 
grantees, and a description of the entire 142-1/2 acres involved 
in the option, and that the defendant Davis had wrongfully 
recorded this deed in the Utah County Recorder's Office 
(Exhibit 12). Verdi White confronted the defendant Davis, 
demanding that the property be returned. The defendant Davis 
wanted the matter to be discussed with his attorney, Mr. Medlin, 
and an appointment was set up for that purpose. Mr. Medlin 
was the appellant Davis' lawyer (R. 89-92). 
At the conference the appellant's attorney, Mr. Medlin, 
stated that the appellant was suit-proof and that he could tie 
up the property for one or two years if necessary, and that it 
was best that some kind of an agreement be made with appellant 
to get it back. At that conference the appellant Davis felt 
that he could sell the 12-1/2 acres involved in this lawsuit 
for $125,000 to the defendant Bertagnole. 
Mr. Mowrey, representing International Mortgages, Inc., 
to whom the 12-1/2 acres had been connnitted, was present at the 
conference. They all agreed to allow Mr. Davis to sell the 
property to Mr. Bertagnole for $125,000, and that if he was 
successful he would have $35,000 for making the sale, $35,000 
would be paid to respondent White, $35,000 would go to Mortgages, 
Inc., and $15,000 would be used to pay off the property under 
3 
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the option, and the balance would go to Mr. Medlin. In an 
attempt to implement this verbal agreement, a wri tt-=n agreeme,,: 
was thereupon prepared in Medlin' s office by Mr. Medlin, signec 
by the Chairman of the Board of respondent and by the appellac: 
Steven Davis (Exhibit 4, R. 93). 
This agreement authorized Mr. Medlin to deliver to the 
respondent a quit-claim deed signed by Steven C. Davis and his 
wife to the 142 acres (Exhibit 14) in the event the contemplatE 
sale of the 12-1/ 2 acres as set forth in that agreement had not 
been consummated, and the money delivered by 5 o'clock P.M. on 
Friday, March 18, 1977. The agreement also provided that Verdi, 
R. White would cooperate in any way with the contemplated sale 
to the defendant Bertagnole and associates. To carry out this 
responsibility, Verdi White was present in the defendant 
Bertagnole's office during March 16th, 17th, and 18th, to give 
cooperation in the event appellant Davis' negotiations with 
Bertagnole ripened into a deal (R.96). 
The quit-claim deed (Exhibit 1) which is the subject mat:i 
of this lawsuit, was prepared in the Bertagnole office by the 
appellant Davis on his own typewriter. The appellant Davis als: 
on that same date prepared an escrow letter on his typewriter, 
which is plaintiff's Exhibit 10, which directed that the quit· 
claim deed be delivered upon the payment of $125, 000, and that 
in the event the sale was not consummated the document should): j 
retuTiled. The Surety Title Company was designated as the 
escrow agent (R. 97). Mr. White was given a copy of the escr~· 
4 
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letter but the original was retained by Mr. Davis and Mr. 
Medlin, and Mr. White never saw the original after that date. 
The witness Verdi White stated that the only reason for being 
in Mr. Bertagnole's office was to close the deal for $125,000, 
and that the $125,000 or any part of it had never been 
received by the respondent (R. 100). Mr. White stated that 
he never authorized the delivery of the deed to Mr. Bertagnole 
unless the sale had been consummated; that he never authorized 
the delivery of the deed to Stewart Title Company in Provo; 
and that he did not become aware of the fact that it had been 
recorded until some time in May or June (R. 101). 
On cross examination the witness, Verdi White, testified 
that it was represented to him that Mr. Medlin was Mr. Davis' 
attorney, and that he never paid Mr. Medlin any attorney's fee 
(R. 104). 
On cross examination the witness, Verdi White, stated 
that the appellant Davis prepared the escrow letter (Exhibit 10), 
and that he left the preparation of the letter up to the appellant 
Davis (R. 106, 107). He stated that Exhibit 1 was handed to the 
appellant Davis and was never tendered to the defendant Bertag-
nole at all (R. 108). 
When it became apparent that Bertagnole was not going to 
pay the $125, 000 for the 12-1/ 2 acres, Mr. Medlin delivered to 
Verdi White Mr. Davis' deed on the 142-1/2 acres, at approxi-
mately 3:30 P.M. so that Mr. White could get it on record in 
Provo that same day (R. 109). 
5 
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Mr. Mowrey, who was present at the Bertagnole offic e, 
was not an agent of the respondent. He was there renr 
, esenting 
his own mortgage company (R. 110). 
The appellant Davis never ever corrnnunicated to the 
respondent any alternative arrangement with Bertagnole with 
respect to the 12-1/2 acres (R. 114). 
The witness Mowrey testified that on behalf of Inter-
national Mortgages, Inc. he had never authorized or approved 
the sale of the 12-1/ 2 acres to Mr. Bertagno le or anyone else 
for less than $125, 000, and that the property had an appraised 
value of $12,500 per acre (R. 129, 130). 
The appellant Davis was called as a witness and testifie: 
as follows: when he recorded the deed which he had made out 
to himself for the 142 acres, he considered himself to be the 
owner. On further interrogation he did not consider himself 
the owner of the 142 acres (R. 148). 
He stated that Jim Medlin was not his attorney but that 
he felt he should have the counsel of a person knowledgeable 
of law, and that he had had some previous dealings with Mr. 
Medlin (R. 150). 
He acknowledged that the sale price to Bertagnole was 
$125,000 (R. 152), and that he was to receive the first $35,000 
out of the sale, and that he was to conduct the negotiations 
with Bertagnole, and that he presented the offer of $125,000 
to the defendant Bertagnole (R. 153). 
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He had knowledge of the previous commitment to 
International Mortgages, Inc. of the subject property for 
$62,500 (R. 134), and he had submitted financial information 
to the bank to help that transaction (R. 155). 
On March 17th, after the completion of the meeting in 
Mr. Medlin's office where Exhibit 4 had been prepared and 
executed, the appellant Davis explained to the defendant 
Bertagnole that he had been given the opportunity of selling 
the 12-1/2 acres to him for $125,000 (R. 158) 
The appellant Davis acknowledged that he prepared 
Exhibit 1 on his typewriter and also Exhibit 10, that he 
didn't know where the original of Exhibit 10 was and didn't 
know what was done with it. He again admitted that at that 
time he understood that the deed was to be delivered to 
Mr. Bertagnole upon his payment of $125,000 (R. 161). 
He stated he was given possession of the deed because 
he was handling the negotiations for the sale to Leo 
Bertagnole on behalf of Gold (R. 161). He admitted being 
given the deed and other escrow documents mentioned in 
Exhibit 10 (R. 162). 
The appellant Davis claimed that there was modification 
of the agreement and that he continued to hold the deed subject 
to the grantee paying $10,000, as represented by the earnest 
money agreement (Exhibit 5), which incidentally shows Steven 
C. Davis as the seller and not the respondent, and could not 
7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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possibly be binding upon the respondent. Although the earnest 
money agreement directs that the purchase price be paid to 
appellant Davis and James B. Medlin, Davis testified that 
he was to receive the $10,000 (R. 162). 
The Exhibit 10 had been prepared by Mr. Medlin after 
Verdi White had left to record the deed in Provo. 
Exhibit 1 was never given to the Surety Title Company 
in escrow as required by Exhibit 10, nor was it delivered to 
Security Title where Exhibit 5 was prepared in the absence 
of a representative of respondent (R. 165). 
On May 3, 1977, the defendant Bertagnole and the 
appellant Davis agreed to modify the $10, 000 purchase require· 
ment between appellant Davis and himself, and in lieu thereof 
Bertagnole was to receive the deed (Exhibit 1) to the 12-1/2 
acres and convey back to Davis 10 acres, retaining 2-1/2 acres 
for himself. When asked if Bertagnole was to get the other 
2-1/ 2 acres because he paid the $100 down to Jim Medlin, the 
appellant Davis answered: 
"Leo Bertagnole and I exhausted a lot of time, money, 
traveling in getting this thing straightened out. And 
I agreed with him that he was deservent of maintaining 
some of that property because of his time and effort. 
But I agreed that with him mutually." (R. 166). 
The appellant Davis described what transpired at the 
Stewart Title Company on May 3, 1977, as follows: 
"Q. So you understood at the when you were at the Stewart 
Title office that at that time he was going to deed you 
back at that time 10 acres. Did he do it right at the 
office? Was it prepared at that office? 
8 
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A. The deed? 
Q. Yes. 
A. For 10 acres? 
Q. Um-hum. 
A. As I recall, yes, it was prepared on a Stewart Title 
Deed. 
Q. Who prepared it? 
A. Stewart Titles. 
Q. They did it for you down there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On that same day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then he signed that deed which I have had marked 
as the Exhibit, Plaintiff's Exhibit 13; is that the deed 
that he signed at that day? 
A. On May 3rd? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this was done at the Stewart Title office? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they were told to record this along with the 
Exhibit l? 
A. Upon the request of Leo, yes." (R. 168). 
The witness Davis testified that all the land in Salem 
Hills was valued at approximately $12,500 an acre (R. 174). 
Exhibit 14 is the deed back to Gold of the 142 acres, 
which was delivered by Mr. Medlin on the 18th, pursuant to 
the March 16th agreement (R. 176). 
9 
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The defendant Bertagnole testified that he did not 
remember having had plaintiff's Exhibit 10 delivered to him, 
and that he did not receive defendant's Exhibit 1 at any time 
prior to the time that it had been recorded, and he stated 
that this deed was not recorded at his instance and request 
(R. 187). 
Bertagnole further testified that he signed the deed 
conveying the 10 acres back to Mr. and Mrs. Davis at the 
Stewart Title Company, and he saw defendant's Exhibit 1 
delivered to the title company at the same time that his 
deed to the 10 acres was given them (R. 188). He stated 
that defendant's Exhibit 1 was not handed to him in his office. 
(R. 191). 
Witness Bertagnole testified that he told Mr. Medlin 
that he was not interested at all in paying $125,000 for 
12-1/ 2 acres (R. 19 7) . He stated that the major part of the 
negotiation was conducted by Mr. Medlin (R. 198). 
With respect to the ultimate exchange of deeds, the 
witness Bertagnole testified as follows: 
"A. Steve called me on tne phone and said, 'Leo, I would 
be willing to give you 2-1/2 acres if you would deed me 
back 10 acres of the property. ' I told Steve that sounded 
like something that was quite generous of him. I did 
explain that I had spent a lot of time and efforts on 
this and I felt that I would be entitled to some con-
sideration. So Steve agreed to give me 2-1/2 acres if 
I would deed the rest of the property back to hirr,." 
(R. 207, 208). 
On further examination by his own counsel, appellant 
Davis acknowledged that he was given possession of defendant's 
Exhibit 1 and that it never did get into Mr. Medlin's hands. 
(R. 215). 
10 
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The appellant Davis testified that on March 17th he 
was endeavoring to sell the 12-1/2 acres to Bertagnole for 
$125, 000 (R. 220). 
The appellant Davis further testified that the sale 
price of $125,000 was the figure stated between Verdi White 
(representing Gold) and Fred Mowrey (representing International 
Mortgages, Inc.) (R. 220). 
The witness Mowrey testified specifically that he never 
agreed with anyone for the alternative sale of the property 
for $10,000. He further testified that Verdi White was not 
present and had left before the $10,000 agreement was reached 
between Davis and Bertagnole (R. 230). 
Mr. Mowrey also testified that he heard Verdi White's 
portion of a telephone conversation with his attorney, Dwight 
King, in which Verdi White stated that he was calling to let 
Mr. King know that he was making no contrary dealings to the 
agreement that had been agreed upon, and that he was leaving 
the others to go to Provo to record the deed, and that he was 
making no other dealings. This telephone call was made in 
the presence of everyone there in the Bertagnole office 
(R. 231). The witness, Verdi White, testified to the same 
effect (R. 236), as did also his son, Verdi White, Jr. 
(R. 238). 
11 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE GREAT PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 
THE TRIAL COURT' S FINDING THAT THERE WAS lW 
VALID DELIVERY OF EXHIBIT 1, AND THAT THE 
DELIVERY CONDITIONS WERE NEVER PERFORMED. 
All of the evidence referred to in the Statement of Fae: 
in this brief establish that the deed (Exhibit 1), was pre-
pared by the appellant Davis on March 17, 1977, on his type-
writer, in the office of the defendant, Leo Bertagnole, and 
that this deed was never delivered to the grantee therein. 
The evidence further clearly and convincingly shows that the 
appellant Davis, to whom the deed was entrusted, was not auth· 
orized to deliver it unless he had received on behalf of the 
grant or the sum of $125, 000 from the grantee, which sum repre· 1 
sented the purchase price of the property described in the deec 1 
(R. 93, 97, 100, 101). Indeed, the appellant Davis acknowledge'. 
that the sale price to the grantee was $125, 000 (R. 152), that i 
he presented the offer of $125, 000 to the grantee after the deE'. 
was prepared (R. 153). He further testified that he was given ' 
possession of the deed and other escrow doct.nnents mentioned 
in Exhibit 10 because he was handling the negotiations for the 
sale to the grantee on behalf of the respondent (R. 161, 162) · 
The grantee in Exhibit 1 testified that he had never received 
the deed at any time prior to the date that it was recorded, 
12 
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and that the deed was not recorded at his instance and 
request (R. 187). The appellant Davis admitted that the 
Surety Title Company was to be the escrow agent of the deed, 
as shown on Exhibit 10, and that the escrow agent was to 
deliver the deed upon payment of $125,000 to the respondent 
(R. 164, Exhibit 10). 
Appellant Davis loosely insisted that all of the 
parties present in Bertagnole's office, including the respon-
dent, agreed to the modification of the sale price to $10,000, 
and that all of the proceeds of that sale were to go to him 
personally. He gave no testimony as to how this agreement 
was reached, what any of the persons said with respect to it 
which indicated such agreement. He obviously based all his 
testimony in that respect on the provisions of the March 16th 
agreement (Exhibit 4) which provided that he was to receive 
the first $35,000 when the sale to Bertagnole was consummated. 
This is indicated by the following excerpt from page 218 of 
the record: 
"Q. And you say now that everybody there agreed 
that that $10,000 would go to you personally? 
A. As stated in the March 16th Agreement, with 
reference to that Agreement." 
It is interesting that Davis felt it was necessary to 
claim that all the others agreed on the modification of the 
escrow and the reduction of the purchase price from $125,000 
to $10,000 -- yet he didn't consult them when he further 
modified it himself by delivering the deed on ~_ay 3rd to the 
13 
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Stewart Title Company for recording in exchange for a deed 
back to himself of 10 of the 12-1/2 acres, in lieu of the 
payment of $10,000. 
Fred Mowrey, representing International Mortgages, Inc 
who had an interest in the sale to Leo Bertagnole, and Verdi 
White, representing the respondent, testified that the con-
dition of the payment of $125, 000 was never altered by eithe: 
of them. It is true that the appellant Davis claimed that 
all agreed to subsequently alter the purchase price requireme:.:' 
for the 12-1/2 acres from $125,000 to $10,000, but the court 
was fully justified in disbelieving this, especially with the 
land having an appraised value of $12,500 per acre (R. 174) 
The appellant Davis relies heavily upon the earnest 
money agreement (Exhibit 5). That agreement was never signed 
by respondent. Appellant Davis had no right to sell the 
property worth over $100,000 to the grantee in the deed for 
$10,000, and his signing the earnest money agreement as the 
seller could not be binding upon the respondent, especially 
when the defendant Bertagnole had full knowledge of the 
respondent's interest in the property. If the earnest money 
agreement is evidence of anything, it is evidence of the fact 
that the quit-claim deed dated March 17th was not considered 
to be absolute by either the appellant Davis or the grantee, 
because the grantee was still endeavoring to purchase the 
property therein described for $10,000. 
14 
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The appellant Davis, having failed in his attempt to 
sell the property to Bertagnole for $125,000 as the condition 
for delivery of the deed required, was still endeavoring to 
get $10,000 for him.self to which he was not entitled. Counsel 
for the appellant claiffiS that in the negotiations regarding 
the $10,000 earnest money agreement, James Medlin was acting 
as attorney for the respondent. This is not true, and is not 
supported by the evidence. The only thing James Medlin was 
authorized to do by the respondent was the closing of the 
projected sale to Bertagnole for $125,000, pursuant to Exhibit 4. 
It is blatantly inconsistent for counsel for the 
appellant to claim that Exhibit 1 was absolute on its face 
on March 17, 1977, when appellant was thereafter endeavoring 
to negotiate the $125,000 sale price with the grantee, and 
failing in that, he still endeavored to negotiate a sale of the 
property to Bertagnole for various other prices including the 
$10,000 earnest money agreement. The record, therefore, clearly 
and convincingly shows that Exhibit 1 had never been delivered 
to the grantee, that the grantee never paid anything for it, 
and that the conditions for the delivery of the deed had never 
been performed. 
The ultimate delivery of Exhibit 1 by the appellant Davis 
to the Stewart Title Company for recording on May 3rd was a 
clear breach of trust. The recording of Exhibit 3, by which 
the grantee on Exhibit 1 endeavored to convey back to appellant 
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Davis 10 acres of the land involved in Exhibit 1, was a furthe: 
clear manifestation of the fact that the grantee in Exhibit 1 
gave no consideration for it to the granter in Exhibit 1. He 
simply collaborated with the appellant in an arrangement to 
provide the appellant with 10 acres of ground for which 
appellant paid nothing to him or, more importantly, to respon-
dent. 
It is mystifying that counsel for the appellant should 
place such heavy reliance upon the earnest money agreement 
between him and the defendant Bertagnole, when neither party to I 
the earnest money agreement considered themselves bound by it, · 
because they negotiated a still different deal between themselve! 
on May 3rd when appellant Davis finally breached his trust by 
allowing Exhibit 1 to be recorded by the Stewart Title Company. 
Furthermore, in claiming that the tenns of the escrow 
letter (Exhibit 10) were extinguished and merged into the terms 
contained in the earnest money agreement, counsel for the 
appellant sidestepped the fact that the respondent was not a 
party to the earnest money agreement and did not at any time, 
verbally or in writing, acquiesce therein or accept it as the 
The appellant Davl.. s' i.· dle seller of the property involved. 
claim that Verdi White, who was already on his way to Provo 
at the time, and Fred Mowrey, agreed to the modification of 
the sales price from $125,000 to $10,000, was incredible and 
· ·bl f bl b l' f The tri· al court was fullY ' insuscepti e o reasona e e ie . 
. ' justified in disbelieving portions of the appellant Davis 
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evasive and contradictory testimony, which were repudiated 
by the uncontroverted testimony of others surmnarized in 
this brief. 
Counsel for the appellant misstates the record and 
misrepresents the fact when she asserts that upon execution 
of the earnest money agreement Leo Bertagnole was given a 
quit-claim deed (defendant's Exhibit 1). The record clearly 
shows that even the terms of the earnest money agreement 
between appellant Davis and Leo Bertagnole were never actually 
carried out. The further fact is that the grantee in 
Exhibit 1 himself testified that he never received delivery of 
the quit-claim deed, and that it was not even recorded at his 
request (R. 187). Even when Exhibit 1 was recorded by the 
Stewart Title Company on May 3, 1977, the grantee had not 
paid to anyone the amount called for by the earnest money 
agreement. He was agreeably surprised that the appellant 
Davis would be willing to give him the deed to 12-1/2 acres 
of valuable land if he would be good enough to deed 10 acres 
of that land back to the appellant Davis (R. 197). Leo 
Bertagnole in this respect testified as follows: 
"Steve called me on the phone and said, "Leo I would 
be willing to give you 2-1/2 acres if you would 
deed me back 10 acres of the property.' I to~d 
Steve that sounded like something that was quite 
generous of him. I did explain that I had spent 
a lot of time and efforts on this and I felt that 
I would be entitled to some consideration. So 
Steve agreed to give me 2-1/2 acres if I would deed 
the rest of the property back ):o him." (R. 207, 208). 
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From the above testimony of the grantee it is quite obvious 
that he had not theretofore paid any consideration for it, 
and that he was pleased to deed back 10 acres to appellant 
Davis and keep 2-1/2 acres for himself. These deeds all 
show on their face that they were recorded at the request of 
Stewart Title Company. 
Again, counsel for appellant sidesteps the fact that 
there was not one iota of evidence in the record to the 
effect that the respondent or any of its officers were ever 
informed of this final transaction between Davis and Bertag-
nole, involving respondent's property, nor is there any 
evidence in the record that the respondent or any of its 
officers ever authorized the final arrangements made between 
Davis and Bertagnole, and the delivery and recording of 
Exhibit 1. The appellant Davis wrongfully parted with the 
possession of Exhibit 1, not because of Bertagnole' s compliance 
with the earnest money agreement between him and Davis, but 
simply because "Leo Bertagnole and I exhausted a lot of time, 
money, traveling in getting this thing straightened out." 
Appellant Davis apparently hoped and expected by this 
devious agreement to obtain for himself 10 acres of valuable 
land for which he paid nothing, either to the defendant 
Bertagnole or to the respondent; and he now comes into this 
court appealing for its sanction of this unjust enrichment of 
himself. He asks this court to reward his breach of trust 
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with its declaration that he is now properly, legally, and 
equitably vested with the ownership of 10 acres of land which 
belongs to the respondent, and for which he paid nothing. 
POINT 2 
THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF EXHIBIT 10 
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Counsel for appellant devotes a considerable part of 
her brief to a discussion of the inadmissability of Exhibit 10, 
and erroneously claims that the evidence fails otherwise to 
show that the deed was conditionally delivered to the appellant 
on March 17, 1977. Whether Exhibit 10 was aclmissable for all 
purposes is not important here. Exhibit 10 was prepared by 
the appellant himself prior to the time that the deed was 
entrusted to him, and is at the very least evidence of the fact 
that he knew that he was not to deliver the deed to the grantee 
unless he had obtained the sale price of $125,000 for the land, 
and that in the event the sale was not consummated that he was 
required to return the deed to the grantor. Although appellant's 
contradictory and evasive testimony in many respects could well 
have been bolstered by documentary evidence, he should not 
complain that Exhibit 10, though a copy, was in full agreement 
with hiw own testimony, that he prepared it, and that at the 
time he prepared it he knew that the condition for the delivery 
of the deed was the payment by the grantee of $125,000. 
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If he didn't know it, why did he immediately thereafter 
endeavor to obtain $125,000 from the grantee? Furthermore, 
when without authority from the grantor he was negotiating 
an alternative price for the land, he knew that no considera-
tion had been paid for the land by the grantee and that the 
deed could not be delivered until the grantee had paid for it. 
The best evidence rule was not offended by the admis-
sion in evidence of Exhibit 10. How could the appellant have 
been prejudiced when he himself prepared the Exhibit, retained 
the original, and did not know what happened to the original? 
He was the last person to have possession of it, and if 
he did not know where it was he would not have been able to 
produce it even if a demand had been made upon him for it 
prior to or during the trial. If the original, which was 
last in his possession, was available to him and if he knew 
where to find it, he certainly could have produced it at the 
trial. He never claimed that the contents of the copy 
offered and received in evidence was in any respect different 
from the original. 
The best evidence rule allows secondary evidence to be 
received at the court's discretion when it is not possible to 
obtain the original documents, particularly when they were last 
known to be in the possession of the adverse party. See Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-25-16, Rule 70 of the Rules 
of Evidence, and Juanita J. Meyer vs General American Corpo~ 
vs William R. McCurtain, 569 P. 2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
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Without regard to Exhibit 10, the great preponderance 
of the evidence supports the court's finding of non delivery 
of Exhibit 1, and non compliance of the grantee with the 
delivery conditions imposed upon him when Exhibit 1 was 
entrusted to him by the grantor. Indeed, there is not any 
believable evidence to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent has no quarrel with any of the prin-
ciples of law set forth in the numerous authorities cited 
in appellant's brief. We earnestly submit that they are 
simply not helpful in the resolution of this appeal, in view 
of the record. Counsel for the appellant should not expect 
to be successful in diverting this court from the issues of 
the case by the citation of irrelevant authority. To reward 
appellant's breach of trust by presenting him with 10 acres 
of land, for which he paid nothing, and allowing defendant 
Bertagnole to obtain 2-1/2 acres of land, for which he paid 
nothing, thus depriving respondent of 12-1/2 acres of valuable 
land, would be a gross miscarriage of justice. 
For the various reasons set forth in this brief, and in 
the furtherance of justice and equity, respondent respectfully 
urges this court to affirm the judgment of the court below. 
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